We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents spread on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be as far from them as possible, and type 2 agents, who wish for the facility to be as close to them as possible. Our goal is to maximize a form of aggregated social benefit. We consider two social benefit functions: the sum of agents' utilities and the minimal agent utility, respectively denoted as the maxisum and the egalitarian objectives. The strategic aspect of the problem is that the agents' locations are not known to us, but rather reported to us by the agents-an agent might misreport his location in an attempt to move the facility towards or away from his true location. We therefore require the facility-locating mechanism to be strategyproof, namely that reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for each agent. As simply maximizing the social benefit is generally not strategyproof, our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms with good approximation ratios.
• We prove a lower bound of 3 on the approximation ratio of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for the maxisum objective, thus proving the optimality of the mechanism we provide for this setting. We also show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a bounded approximation ratio for the egalitarian objective. These bounds hold even when all agents are of type 1.
• We prove a lower bound of 3 2 on the approximation ratio of randomized strategyproof mechanisms for both the maxisum and egalitarian objectives. These bounds hold even when all agents are of type 1.
• We consider a generalized model that allows an agent to control more than one location.
In this model, we provide a 3-and 3 2 -approximate strategyproof mechanisms for the deterministic and randomized settings respectively, assuming only type 1 agents are present (matching our proven lower bounds).
Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, and let I be the closed interval. We assume, without loss of generality, that I = [0, 2]. Each agent i ∈ N reports a location x i ∈ I. The vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is a location profile; for any α ∈ I, we also use the notation (α, x −i ) = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i−1 , α, x i+1 , . . . , x n ), where x −i = (x 1 , x 2 , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) is a partial location profile of all agents but i. A deterministic mechanism is a collection of functions f = {f n |n ∈ N} such that each f n : I n → I maps each location profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) to the location of the facility. We use f (x) instead of f n (x) when n is clear from the context. Similarly, a randomized mechanism is a collection of functions f that maps each location profile to a probability distribution over I: if f (x) is the distribution π, then the facility is located by drawing a single sample from π.
We study deterministic and randomized mechanisms for the problem of locating a single facility when the location of any agent is private information to that agent and cannot be observed or otherwise verified. It is therefore critical that the mechanism be strategyproof-it should be optimal for each agent i to report his true location x i . To make this precise, we assume that if the facility is located at y, an agent's utility, equivalently benefit, is either B i (x i , y) = |x i − y|, if he is a type 1 agent, or B i (x i , y) = 2 − |x i − y| 1 , if he is a type 2 agent. If the location of the facility is randomly distributed with distribution π, then the benefit of agent i is simply
where Y is a random variable with distribution π. We denote the set of type j agents as N j for j = 1, 2. The formal definition of strategyproofness is now: Definition 1. A deterministic (randomized) mechanism f is strategyproof if for each i ∈ N , each x i , x ′ i ∈ I, and for each
. In this paper we assume that locating a facility at y when the location profile is x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) gives the social benefit sb(x, y), where we consider two possible options for sb: maxisum, defined by sb(x, y) = n i=1 B i (x i , y), and egalitarian, sb(x, y) = min i∈N B i (x i , y). When the facility is located according to a probability distribution π, maxisum is defined as
The goal is to find a strategyproof mechanism that does well with respect to maximizing (either definition of) the social benefit. A natural mechanism is the "optimal" mechanism: each location profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is mapped to OP T (x), defined as 2 OP T (x) ∈ arg max y∈I sb(x, y). However, the optimal mechanism is not generally strategyproof. Given that strategyproofness and optimality cannot be achieved simultaneously, it is necessary to find a tradeoff. In this paper we shall restrict ourselves to strategyproof mechanisms that approximate the optimal social benefit as best as possible: an α-approximation (α ∈ [1, ∞)) algorithm guarantees at least a 1 α fraction of the optimal social benefit for every instance of the problem. Formally, the approximation ratio of an algorithm A is sup T {OP T (T )/A(T )}, where the supremum is taken over all possible instances T of the problem; and A(T ) and OP T (T ) are, respectively, the benefits obtained by algorithm A and the optimal algorithm on the instance T . Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms whose approximation ratio is as close to 1 as possible.
Deterministic and Randomized Mechanisms for the Hybrid Model
In this section, we provide a best-possible 3-approximate deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the maxisum objective, as well as a 23 13 -approximate randomized strategyproof mechanism for the same objective.
Let f be the mechanism that locates the facility at 2 if |R| ≥ |L| and at 0 otherwise. Then f is a 3-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the maxisum objective.
Proof. Strategyproofness is easy. Note that R is the set of agents who weakly prefer the facility located at 2 over 0, and L is the set of remaining agents. Since there are only two possible facility locations in this mechanism, the only case which requires analysis is when agent i prefers the facility to be located at the endpoint not chosen by the mechanism. Assume without loss of generality that the facility is located at 2, yet agent i prefers the facility to be located at 0 (that is, i ∈ L). Then, by misreporting, he cannot decrease |R| and cannot increase |L|, and therefore regardless of his report, the facility will be located at 2.
For the approximation ratio, let x be a location profile. We would like to show that sb(x,a) sb(x,f (x)) ≤ 3 for every possible facility location a ∈ I 3 . We will prove this for the case of f (x) = 2; the other case is similar. Let R j be the set of agents of type j in R, and similarly let L j be the set of agents of type j in L. Then q 1 = sb(x, a) = i∈R 1 ∪L 1 |x i − a| + i∈R 2 ∪L 2 (2 − |x i − a|), and q 2 = sb(x, f (x)) = i∈R 1 ∪L 1 (2 − x i ) + i∈R 2 ∪L 2 x i . If the ratio q 1 q 2 < 1, there is nothing to prove. Assume
, increasing x i by α decreases the denominator by α, and decreases the numerator by at most α (might even increase the numerator in some cases). Since the ratio is at least 1, such a change increases the ratio. Similarly, for i ∈ R 2 ∪ L 2 , decreasing x i has the same effect. Given that
. We break our proof into two cases:
where the inequality follows from the fact that the maximum is obtained when a ∈ {0, 1} (If −|R 1 |−|L 1 |−|L 2 |+|R 2 | ≤ 0, then it is obtained at a = 0, and otherwise at a = 1). Note that |L| ≤ |R| since f (x) = 2, and that |R 2 | ≤ |R| by definition. Thus, max {|R| + 2|L|, |L| + 2|R 2 |} ≤ 3|R|. Therefore,
Again, both terms we're maximizing over are no more than 3|R|, and so again
Later, we prove a lower bound of 3 on the approximation ratio possible under strategyproofness. Thus, the approximation ratio achieved by this mechanism is best-possible. Moreover, in the 3 Note that the statement " sb(x,a) sb(x,f (x)) ≤ 3 for every possible facility location a ∈ I" is equivalent to
≤ 3, as OP T (x) maximizes the numerator by definition and hence the ratio. However, we choose to analyze an arbitrary fixed a rather than OP T (x) to avoid having to consider the impact agents' reports have on the optimal location of the facility.
obnoxious facility model (N 2 = ∅), the above mechanism reduces to the deterministic mechanism proposed by Cheng et al. [4] , who proved that it is a 3-approximation for that special case. We now use randomization in an attempt to lower the approximation ratio. Getting a 2-approximation is easy: choosing each endpoint with probability . Consider the following randomized mechanism f . If |R| ≥ |L|, then P (f (x) = 2) = p 1 and P (f (x) = 0) = p 2 ; if |R| < |L|, then P (f (x) = 2) = p 2 and P (f (x) = 0) = p 1 ; and either way, P (f (x) = 1) = p 3 . The mechanism f is a strategyproof, 23 13 -approximate mechanism.
Proof. Strategyproofness is easy. For the approximation ratio, we would like to show that
13 for every possible facility location a ∈ I. We will prove this for the case of |R| ≥ |L|; the other case is similar. Define R j and L j as in the proof of theorem 1. We begin by noting that the approximation ratio is bounded from above by 46 19 (it is easy to see that every agent is guaranteed a benefit of at least 19 23 in our mechanism, while the maximal benefit of any agent is 2). Note that the mechanism's expected benefit is q 2 = − 7 23 i∈R 1
We break into cases:
1. a ∈ [0, 1]: in this case, the benefit from locating the facility at a is
Note that the ratio
increases with x i for i ∈ L 1 , and decreases with x i for i ∈ R 2 ; thus, to maximize it, we set x i = 2 for i ∈ L 1 and x i = 1 for i ∈ R 2 . For i ∈ L 2 , x i = a maximizes the ratio (note that changing x i by α decreases the numerator by α and either increases or decreases the denominator by 7 23 α, a change that decreases the ratio since it is known to be no more than . Depending on a, to maximize the ratio we need to set x i = 0 for all i ∈ R 1 or x i = 1 for all i ∈ R 1 . We check both cases: (a) x i = 0 for all i ∈ R 1 . Then the ratio becomes . As
this ratio increases with a and hence maximized at a = 1 5 , which leads to the ratio: . Maximization occurs either at a = 1 or at a = 0. We check both cases:
i. a = 1: the ratio becomes 4 Cheng et al. [4] note that this mechanism is 2-approximate for the obnoxious facility model; this still holds true for the hybrid model. 5 Of course, for agents i ∈ L2 we technically cannot have xi = 1, but the bound holds nonetheless.
ii. a = 0: the ratio becomes 2. a ∈ [1, 2] : in this case, the benefit from locating the facility at a is
Similarly to the analysis in the previous case, we get that the ratio
is maximized when
, and x i = 1 for all i ∈ L 1 or x i = 2 for all i ∈ L 1 . We break into cases: 
. Maximum is obtained at either a = 1 or a = 2:
i. a = 1: the ratio becomes The approximation ratio of the mechanism above is tight: when there are two agents of different types, with the type 1 agent at 1 and the type 2 agent at 0, the optimal benefit is 3, whereas the mechanism's expected benefit is 39 23 , and the ratio is exactly 
Characterization of Deterministic Mechanisms for the Obnoxious Facility Model
We now focus on the special case where N 2 = ∅, also called the obnoxious facility model. The assumption N 2 = ∅ will remain in effect for the rest of the paper. In this section, we characterize all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. A similar result has been independently obtained by Han and Du in an unpublished paper [7] . We begin with a temporary, somewhat weak characterization of deterministic mechanisms, in terms of single agent deviations:
Theorem 3 (Reflection Theorem). For any deterministic mechanism f , agent i ∈ N , and partial location profile x −i , define f x −i (a) = f (a, x −i ) 6 . Then, the mechanism f is strategyproof iff each f x −i is of the following form: there exists (not necessarily distinct) α x −i , β x −i ∈ I, such that β x −i ≥ α x −i and:
the reflection point of i for the partial profile x −i .
Proof. First, assume that f is of the form described above. On a partial location profile x −i , agent i can only get the mechanism to choose one of (up to) two locations:
. If x i = q, his distance from the two locations is equal, and so he is indifferent between them. If x i ∈ [0, q), β x −i is weakly 7 farther from him than α x −i , and so he weakly prefers β x −i , which is what the mechanism chooses, so he has no incentive to deviate. The case of x i ∈ (q, 2] is similar. Thus, f is strategyproof.
On the other hand, assume that f is strategyproof. Fix a location profile x and an agent i. Let g = f x −i and let β = g(0). Let S = {a ∈ I : g(a) = β}. If S is empty, then g is constant, and we're done. So assume S is nonempty. Consider m = inf S. Note that if β < m, then an agent located at β can benefit from a deviation to any point in S. Thus, β ≥ m. Let α = 2m − β (note that with our knowledge at this point, it might be the case that α is negative and hence not in I; our proof is careful not to assume otherwise). We begin by claiming that either g(m) = α, or that m is a limit point of the set T = {a ∈ I : g(a) = α}. There are two cases to consider:
1. m ∈ S. Note that in this case m > 0. We claim that in this case g(m) = α. Assume otherwise, namely g(m) = α ′ = α. Note also that α ′ = β (since m ∈ S), and thus m − α = |m − α ′ |. There are two subcases:
In that case, note that as long as the agent is to the left of m, the facility is located at β. Thus, if the agent is located at m−ǫ for some ǫ > 0, his distance from the facility is β − m + ǫ. His distance from α ′ is at least |m − α ′ | − ǫ. However, as β −m = m−α < |m−α ′ |, we may choose ǫ small enough so that |m−α ′ |−ǫ > β −m+ǫ. In this case, the agent's deviation from m − ǫ to m is beneficial to that agent.
In this case, it is still true that as long as the agent is to the left of m, the facility is located at β. As the distance of β − m = m − α > |m − α ′ |, it follows that an agent located at m will benefit from deviating to the left.
So indeed, g(m) = α.
2. m / ∈ S. Then m is a limit point of S (by definition). In this case we claim that m is a limit point of T . Furthermore, note that β > m, since if β = m, then as m / ∈ S, g(β) = β, and the agent can benefit by deviating from β to any point in S. We note that since when the agent is located at m, the facility is located at β, strategyproofness dictates that the facility is always located in [α, β], no matter where the agent reports his location to be. Now, assume m is not a limit point of T . Thus, it follows it must be a limit point of either T 1 = {a ∈ I : α < g(a) ≤ m} or T 2 = {a ∈ I : m ≤ g(a) < β} 8 . So, there are two cases:
(a) m is a limit point of T 1 . In particular, there exists some ǫ > 0 such that m + ǫ ∈ T 1 . We consider the following subcases:
i. There exists 0 < ǫ ′ < ǫ s.t. m + ǫ ′ ∈ T 1 and g(m + ǫ ′ ) < g(m + ǫ); in this case, a deviation from m + ǫ to m + ǫ ′ is beneficial.
ii. There exists 0 < ǫ ′ < ǫ s.t. m + ǫ ′ ∈ T 1 and g(m + ǫ ′ ) > g(m + ǫ); in this case, a deviation from m + ǫ ′ to m + ǫ is beneficial.
iii. g(m + ǫ ′ ) = g(m + ǫ) for all 0 < ǫ ′ < ǫ s.t. m + ǫ ′ ∈ T 1 . As m is a limit point of T 1 and all points in T 1 are to the right of m, it follows that we may choose ǫ ′ as small as we want. For ǫ ′ small enough, this would imply that the deviation from m + ǫ ′ to m is beneficial: the distance of m + ǫ ′ from g(m + ǫ) is m − g(m + ǫ) + ǫ ′ and the distance of m + ǫ ′ from β is β − m − ǫ ′ . As β − m > m − g(m + ǫ), we may choose ǫ ′ small enough to make the deviation in question beneficial.
(b) m is a limit point of T 2 . So, there exists 0 < ǫ < β−m 2 such that m + ǫ ∈ T 2 . The agent can benefit by deviating from m + ǫ to m (since the facility will be sent from g(m + ǫ) to β, and since m ≤ g(m + ǫ) < β, g(m + ǫ) is closer to m + ǫ than β).
Hence, by strategyproofness, we have reached a contradiction, and so m must be a limit point of T .
We have shown that if m ∈ S then g(m) = α, and otherwise by definition of S g(m) = β. To complete the proof, we must show that g(a) = α for all a > m. Assume otherwise for some a ′ > m. First, note that since g(m) is either α or β, g(a) ∈ [α, β] for all a ∈ I by strategyproofness. Note that within this range, α is the point farthest from a ′ . Thus, the agent has an incentive to deviate from a ′ to any point a ′′ for which g(a ′′ ) = α, where the existance of such a point is guaranteed by the above discussion. This is a contradiction, and so we've completed our proof. 9 As a corollary of the above theorem, we can deduce: Corollary 1. For any deterministic strategyproof mechanism f , and any n ∈ N, R f n = {f n (x) : x ∈ I n } is finite. −i ) equals one of f (z) or f (z ′ ), as required 10 . Set x i equal to a profile among z and z ′ satisfying the equality. Thus, x n is a profile in which all agents are located at the endpoints and f (x n ) = f (x). Since x was arbitrary, we have that all elements of R f n can be obtained by applying the mechanism to profiles locating all agents at the endpoints. Since there are only finitely many such profiles, R f n is finite. Now it is time for our strong characterization result. Consider the following definition: Definition 2. Let f be a deterministic mechanism s.t. |R f n | ≤ 2 for all n ∈ N. For each n ∈ N, let R f n = {α n , β n } s.t. β n ≥ α n 11 , and let m n = αn+βn 2
. For any n ∈ N, for every profile x ∈ I n , consider the partition of the agents L x n = {i ∈ N : x i < m n }, M x n = {i ∈ N : x i = m n }, and E x n = {i ∈ N : x i > m n }. We say that f is a midpoint mechanism if it satisfies the following property: for any n ∈ N, let x, y ∈ I n be any profiles s.t. f (x) = β n and f (y) = α n . If β n > α n , then there exists an agent i which satisfies one of the following:
This definition is simple to interpret: the mechanism can switch the facility location from right to left or from left to right only when an agent crosses the midpoint in the opposite direction.
Ibara and Nagamochi [8] showed that for a strategyproof mechanism f , whenever R f n is a finite set, |R f n | ≤ 2 12 . Using that, we can now show: Theorem 4. A deterministic mechanism f is strategyproof iff it is a midpoint mechanism.
10 f (z) if f (m) = βx −i , and f (z ′ ) if f (m) = αx −i . 11 αn = βn is possible. 12 While they assume anonymity, the proof of this fact does not rely on that assumption. n 2 at m n − ǫ for some ǫ > 0, and agrees with x on the rest of the agents. Since no deviating agent reaches m n , the facility location doesn't change, that is f (y) = f (x) = β n . Locating the facility at β n (on profile y) leads to a benefit of n 2 · ( βn−αn 2 + ǫ), while locating the facility at α n leads to a benefit of
, and sending ǫ → 0 gives us the required result. 13
By Theorem 1, our lower bound is best-possible. Our characterization can also be used to get a lower bound for the egalitarian objective: Theorem 6. No deterministic strategyproof mechanism f can provide a bounded approximation ratio for the egalitarian objective, even when N 2 = ∅.
Proof. Assume N 2 = ∅. For any n ≥ 2, |R f n | ≤ 2 by theorem 4. Consider any profile which locates at least one agent at each point in R f n ; any such profile leads to a social benefit of 0 for the mechanism, whereas the optimal benefit is positive.
Lower Bounds on Randomized Mechanisms
We begin with the maxisum objective. We provide a lower bound of 3 2 on the best-possible approximation ratio obtainable by randomized strategyproof mechanisms. Lemma 1. For any randomized strategyproof mechanism f , there exists a randomized strategyproof mechanism f ′ which satisfies P (f ′ (x) ∈ {0, 2, x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }) = 1 for each x ∈ I n and has the same approximation ratio as f for the maxisum objective.
Proof. Let x ∈ I n . Let us divide I to the following segments: for 1
is the location of the i-th agent from the left, breaking ties arbitrarily; note that some of the s i 's might be empty). We also define s 0 = (0, x [1] ) and s n = (x [n] , 2). For convenience of notation we define x [0] = 0 and x [n+1] = 2. Let p i = P (f (x) ∈ s i ), and let y i be the random variable f (x) conditional on f (x) ∈ s i (defined only if P (f (x) ∈ s i ) > 0). When y i is defined, define p l i and p r i to be the unique nonnegative solutions to
Verifying that P (f ′ (x) ∈ I) = 1 is easy. Note that the expected distance from every agent in every profile remains the same as it is in f , and so f ′ is also strategyproof and has an identical social benefit to f on every profile (and thus the same approximation ratio). 13 If n is odd, we could still make this proof work by locating the additional agent at mn and send n → ∞.
Theorem 7.
No randomized strategyproof mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 3 2 for the maxisum objective, even when N 2 = ∅.
Proof. Assume N 2 = ∅. Let f is such a mechanism, and consider the case of 2 agents. By our lemma, we may assume that P (f (x) ∈ {0, 2, x 1 , x 2 }) = 1 for all profiles x ∈ I 2 . As a convenient notation, we write p x q = P (f (x) = q). Consider the profile y in which y 1 = 1 − ǫ and y 2 = 2 for some small ǫ > 0. Since f strictly beats the approximation ratio of We note that, when N 2 = ∅, theorem 10 provides a family of randomized 3 2 -approximate strategyproof mechanisms for the maxisum objective. Hence, when N 2 = ∅, the above lower bound is best-possible.
Finally, we show the same lower bound for the egalitarian objective:
No randomized strategyproof mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than Proof. Assume N 2 = ∅. Let f be such a mechanism, with approximation ratio c < . Consider the profile x ′ , which is obtained from profile x by relocating the agents from 0 so that there is an agent in every point aǫ ∈ [0, 1) s.t. a ∈ N. Let p ′ be the probability that on this profile, the facility is located at [0, M + 1]. Note that the optimal facility location remains M + 1 1 2 with benefit 1 2 , and on the other hand the expected benefit on this profile is bounded by
. Let us analyze the expected distance of the facility from 0 in the two profiles. For x, the expected distance from 0 is no more than
. On the other hand, for x ′ , the expected distance from 0 is no less than (1 − p ′ )(M + 1). Since we have obtained x ′ from x using deviations of agents from 0, strategyproofness dictates 14 . Reorganizing this, we get:
Using our bounds for p and p ′ , this implies the inequality
. Let us reorganize this inequality to 
Mutiple Locations Per Agent in the Obnoxious Model
In this section we follow the spirit of a suggestion by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [10] and study a generalized model, in which a single agent may be associated with more than one location. As this multiple location model is a generalization of our previous model, the lower bounds carry over; in particular, for the maxisum objective, we have lower bounds of 3 and 3 2 on deterministic and randomized mechanisms respectively, even when N 2 = ∅. We show that when N 2 = ∅, we can find strategyproof mechanisms to match these lower bounds, despite the additional power given to the agents.
Our generalized model (for the definition of the model, we do not assume N 2 = ∅) can be obtained from our previous model via the following changes. First, let k = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) ∈ N n . A location profile is now z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ), where for each i = 1, ..., n, z i = (z i 1 , z i 2 , . . . , z i k i ) ∈ I k i . A deterministic mechanism is a collection of functions f = {f k n : n ∈ N, k ∈ N n }, such that f k n : I k 1 × . . . × I kn → I is a function that maps each location profile to a facility location. The benefit of agent i from facility location y is now defined as B i (z i , y) = k i j=1 B i (z i j , y), where B i (x, y) is |x − y| for a type 1 agent and 2 − |x − y| for a type 2 agent. The maxisum objective is n i=1 B i (z i , y) as usual. The rest of the notation carries over, and the adjustment to the randomized model is easy and left to the reader. For the approximation ratio, we note that the possible instances of the problem include all possible options for both n and k.
First, we provide a 3-approximate strategyproof deterministic mechanism for the case where N 2 = ∅.
Theorem 9. Let R * = {i :
. Let f be the mechanism which locates the facility at 2 if i∈R * k i ≥ i∈L * k i and at 0 otherwise. This mechanism is strategyproof and 3-approximate for the maxisum objective when N 2 = ∅.
Proof. Strategyproofness is easy (note that R * is exactly the set of agents weakly preferring the facility to be located at 2 over 0). The optimal facility location is clearly in {0, 2}. Assume without loss of generality that f (z) = 2. All we have to prove is that sb(z,0) sb(z,2) ≤ 3. But note that every agent i ∈ R * receives a benefit of at least k i when the facility is located at 2 and at most k i when the facility is located at 0. On the other hand, each agent i ∈ L * trivially gets a benefit between 0 and 2k i . Thus, using the fact that f (z) = 2 implies i∈R * k i ≥ i∈L * k i , we get sb(z,0) sb(z,2) ≤ 2 i∈L * k i + i∈R * k i i∈R * k i ≤ 2 i∈R * k i + i∈R * k i i∈R * k i = 3.
Note that when k i = 1 for all i, this mechanism reduces to the mechanism proposed by Cheng et al. [4] .
Finally, we define a class of randomized strategyproof mechanisms that provide a
